Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition

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Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition. / Blomberg, Olle.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, No. 2, 2016, p. 351-372.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Blomberg, O 2016, 'Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition', Philosophical Studies, vol. 173, no. 2, pp. 351-372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z

APA

Blomberg, O. (2016). Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition. Philosophical Studies, 173(2), 351-372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z

Vancouver

Blomberg O. Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition. Philosophical Studies. 2016;173(2):351-372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z

Author

Blomberg, Olle. / Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition. In: Philosophical Studies. 2016 ; Vol. 173, No. 2. pp. 351-372.

Bibtex

@article{2d5eed28ea634a35858debef3b46e0ba,
title = "Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition",
abstract = "What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so several agents’ actions are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Influential accounts of intentional joint action, including Christopher Kutz's and Michael Bratman's, implicitly include this condition only if participants must intend to contribute to the end under the same conception. While such a requirement successfully rules out some counterexamples, it also makes the accounts unable to appropriately accommodate and explain clear cases of intentional joint action that they ought to be able to accommodate and explain",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Intentional joint action, Shared intention, Common goal, Doxastic single end condition, Christopher Kutz, Michael Bratman",
author = "Olle Blomberg",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z",
language = "English",
volume = "173",
pages = "351--372",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition

AU - Blomberg, Olle

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so several agents’ actions are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Influential accounts of intentional joint action, including Christopher Kutz's and Michael Bratman's, implicitly include this condition only if participants must intend to contribute to the end under the same conception. While such a requirement successfully rules out some counterexamples, it also makes the accounts unable to appropriately accommodate and explain clear cases of intentional joint action that they ought to be able to accommodate and explain

AB - What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so several agents’ actions are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Influential accounts of intentional joint action, including Christopher Kutz's and Michael Bratman's, implicitly include this condition only if participants must intend to contribute to the end under the same conception. While such a requirement successfully rules out some counterexamples, it also makes the accounts unable to appropriately accommodate and explain clear cases of intentional joint action that they ought to be able to accommodate and explain

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Intentional joint action

KW - Shared intention

KW - Common goal

KW - Doxastic single end condition

KW - Christopher Kutz

KW - Michael Bratman

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z

DO - 10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z

M3 - Journal article

VL - 173

SP - 351

EP - 372

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 137630190